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Abstract:
Was the East Asian crisis just a creditor panic with a mad scramble for liquidity that
brought the banking system to its knees and the region's much-vaunted 'economic miracle' to a
standstill? Or was the miracle indeed flawed by fundamental problems in asset prices and
resource allocation? After a summary of the facts and an outline of various types of financial
crisis, we conclude that the truth involves both factors, interacting in a vicious downward spiral.
There certainly was panic among the creditors but it was triggered by genuine problems of
overinvestment and overvaluation in emerging East Asian economies.
Before turning to outline various approaches of crisis prevention and management and a brief
account of the future prospects, we discuss how contagion can occur in environments where
investors are poorly informed and each looks to the others for guidance. The paper ends with
immediate steps that might help resolve the current crises; and with proposed reforms to the
international monetary system to prevent a recurrence.
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Non-Technical Summary:
No one can deny the outstanding success of the East Asian economies in the last two
decades of rapid economic growth backed by surging capital inflows. Key questions posed by
the current crisis are: what went wrong, and why? how to fix it? and, how to prevent a
recurrence? To answer them, the paper begins with a brief overview of recent developments in
the miracle economies of East Asia, focusing mainly on Korea, Indonesia and Thailand. We
focus too on some of the shadows that came to darken the glittering success story – on declining
competitiveness and growing financial vulnerability; and on regulatory failures in banking. Then
we take a leaf from Charles Kindleberger’s book (1996) on Panics, Manias and Crashes and
discuss – with historical precedents – various types of financial crisis: speculative attacks on
pegged exchange rates, asset bubbles, stock market crashes and bank runs. Based on the
distinction between illiquidity , due to a shortage of cash, and insolvency arising from a failure
of economic prospects, we go on to outline three main views of the current crisis.
First that it was simply due to reversal of capital flows, to a failure of collective action on
the part of creditors which could and should have been solved by supplying extra liquidity – or
by forcing creditors to rollover their loans. Second the view that the miracle had grown into a
bubble that finally had to burst: so the problem was essentially one of insolvency. Finally the
view that we prefer, that the panic was not wholly groundless (and rescue efforts were bound to
be difficult) mainly because weak regulation combined with implicit deposit guarantees had left
local bankers free to gamble with the money that global capital markets had poured into their
parlours. Panic set in when foreign depositors realised that there were no  enough dollar reserves
left for the guarantee to be credible. This account (championed most notably by Paul Krugman
of MIT) involves both illiquidity and insolvency and helps to explain why the IMF was
unwilling simply to throw money at the problem.
Why did the crisis spread like wild-fire around the region? Was it because a bank run due
to shaky fundamentals in one country was imitated elsewhere, as investors joined the herd
heading for the exit? This and other accounts of contagion are discussed before turning to ideas
for crisis prevention and management, and a brief account of future prospects for the region. The
paper concludes by outlining immediate steps to resolve the current financial crisis and by
proposing international monetary reforms to prevent a recurrence.
3“Theories without facts are empty: facts without theories are blind”.
Immanuel Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason
1. Introduction
What is so special about the East Asian crisis? Radelet and Sachs (1998a, p.1)
provide a graphic answer as follows: “The East Asian financial crisis is remarkable in
several ways. The crisis has hit the most rapidly growing economies in the world. It has
prompted the largest financial bailouts in history. It is the sharpest financial crisis to hit
the developing world since the 1982 debt crisis. It is the least anticipated financial crisis
in years”.
After a brief account of the facts in section 2, we outline various types of
financial crisis (section 3). Then in section 4, we ask which theory best fits the facts.
Was the East Asian crisis essentially creditor panic where a mad scramble for liquidity
brought inherently sound financial and economic system to its knees as Radelet and
Sachs (1998b) suggest? ;or was the miracle indeed flawed by fundamental problems in
asset prices and resource allocation? We conclude that both factors played a role: there
was certainly a creditor panic, but it was in large part due to economic excesses in the
domestic private sector and inadequate regulatory responses by the government,
particularly in respect of banking. Section 5 discusses how contagion can occur in
environments where investors are poorly informed and each looks to the others for
guidance. Various approaches to crisis prevention and management are outlined in
section 6. Then, after a brief look at prospects for recovery, the paper concludes with
immediate steps that might help resolve the current crises; and with proposed reforms
to the international monetary system to prevent a recurrence.
2. Main features of East Asian crises
Calvo and Goldstein (1996, p.25) have noted that “in a sense, every financial
crisis can be regarded as a failure of the early warning system”. But the early warning
macroeconomic indicators that were relevant for the 1994/5 Mexican crisis – too much
consumption (too low saving), persistent budget deficit and high rate of inflation – did
not apply in the East Asian economies. So those seeking the main-springs of the recent
crisis need to look elsewhere – at the weakness of financial system, for example, due to
inefficient and inadequate regulation and (implicit or explicit) government guarantees.
4This has led many critics to conclude that the problems these countries face
today arise not because government did too much, but because they did too little. Put
differently, the roots of the crisis lie in private sector activities1. The build-up of short-
term foreign liabilities (on an unhedged basis) during economic boom, and the mis-
allocation to unsound projects and non-productive sectors exposed these economies to
a sudden loss of confidence. When it came, the capital outflows, together with the
depreciation of local currency and collapse of asset prices, exacerbated the financial
position of the private sector and the crisis proved self-fulfilling.
In this section, we provide a summary of the four main elements that
contributed to the onset of the crisis in East Asia2; specifically a) external factors and
macroeconomic imbalances, b) private capital inflows, c) the role of financial
intermediation, and d) the behaviour of asset prices.
a) External factors and macroeconomic imbalances
East Asian countries have enjoyed an impressive economic performance for
several decades: in Korea, Indonesia and Thailand – the countries we focus on in this
section – GDP grew at around 8-9 percent per annum from the beginning of the 1990s
till 1996. In Korea, the rapid growth in output – of chips, ships, and cars, for example
– was backed by rapid capital accumulation financed by a high rate of domestic saving
– about 35 percent of GDP. Thai residents also saved about the third of their income –
and invested even more: Indonesians saved and invested just over a quarter of their
income (see Appendix 1). Public sector deficits have often been preceded currency
crises, as in Mexico 1994/5: but this was not the case in East Asia. Through the 1990s,
government budgets were more or less in balance in Korea and Indonesia, and in
surplus in Thailand (see Table 1). Moreover, the rate of inflation in these countries was
kept relatively low.
Until 1997, macroeconomic management in most emerging markets – including
Korea, Indonesia and Thailand – involved effectively pegging the exchange rate against
the US dollar even though, as the dollar appreciated against the yen – by 50 percent
from mid 1995 to end 1997 – this led to an increasing loss of trade competitiveness
                                                 
1 See the statement given by Joseph Stiglitz in the Meeting of Finance Ministers of Asean plus 6 with
the IMF and the World bank (December 1, 1997).
5and export shares. Other external factors also played a role in the build-up of pressures
in 1996 and early 1997, namely the cyclical slowdown in world trade and
disappointingly low growth in Japan, for example. The consequence was persistent and
widening current account deficits, and, in 1996, the end of export growth for both
Korea and Thailand.
Table 1: Selected macroeconomic indicators
(Annual percentage change unless otherwise noted)
Korea 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98
Real GDP growth 9.5 9.1 5.1 5.8 8.6 8.9 7.1 5.5e -3.6f
Inflation 8.6 9.3 6.2 4.8 6.3 4.5 4.9 4.4e 12.5f
Domestic saving1 36.135.935.135.234.635.133.3 - -
Gov't budget balance1 -0.7 -1.6 -0.5 0.6 0.3 0.3 -0.1 - -
Export growth2 4.2 10.5 6.6 7.3 16.830.3 3.7 - -
Current account balance1 -0.9 -3.1 -1.6 0.2 -1.3 -2.1 -5.0 -1.9e 6.9f
Real exchange rate3 100 99 94 93 91 88 88 157 -
Indonesia 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98
Real GDP growth 9.0 8.9 7.2 7.3 7.5 8.2 8.0 7.0e -10.0f
Inflation 7.8 9.4 7.5 9.7 8.5 9.4 7.9 6.6e 60.0f
Domestic saving1 27.928.727.331.429.229.028.8 - -
Gov't budget balance1 0.4 0.4 -0.4 0.6 0.9 2.2 1.2 - -
Export growth2 15.913.516.6 8.4 8.8 13.4 9.7 - -
Current account balance1 -2.8 -3.5 -2.3 -1.6 -1.8 -3.4 -3.4 -5.0e 7.3f
Real exchange rate3 100 99 92 88 92 89 80 150 -
Thailand 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98
Real GDP growth 11.6 8.1 8.2 8.5 8.9 8.7 6.4 0.5e -4.2f
Inflation 6.0 5.7 4.1 3.4 5.1 5.8 5.9 5.6e 15.0f
Domestic saving1 32.635.234.334.934.934.333.1 - -
Gov't budget balance1 4.5 4.7 2.8 2.1 1.9 2.9 2.3 - -
Export growth2 14.923.214.213.322.725.1 -1.3 - -
Current account balance1 -8.3 -7.8 -5.7 -5.1 -5.7 -8.1 -8.0 -3.5e 7.9f
Real exchange rate3 100 97 90 88 89 87 80 124 -
1 In percent of GDP
2 based on nominal US dollar
3 based on WPI; trade-weighted, 1990=10
e (JPMorgan) estimate
f (JPMorgan) forecast
Sources: IMF (1997), Radelet and Sach (1998a,b), and JPMorgan, Asian Financial Market report,
2Q98.
                                                                                                                                
2 For extensive reviews of the East Asian crisis, see Bhatttacharya et al.(1998), Corsetti et al.(1998),
and Radelet and Sachs (1998a,b).
6b) Net capital flows to East Asia
In the past decade, emerging markets around the world have received
substantial capital flows from industrial countries. The figures for net private capital
inflows to East Asia in Figure 1 shows inflows averaging between 1 and 3 percent of
GDP in the 1980s, rising to levels ranging from 5 percent of GDP for Korea to 10
percent for the Philippines by 1996. This surge was both large and persistent: Malaysia
and Thailand, for example, received private capital inflows averaging about 9 and 10
percent of GDP for the six-year period, 1989-95.
Figure 1: Net private capital inflows
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Source: World Economic Outlook, IMF, December 1997.
The composition of these flows, as between equity investment and private
lending, can be seen from Table 2. In the three years 1994-96, net external financing
came to 221 billion dollars: direct investment played a small role relative to portfolio
investment and commercial bank lending of 129 billion. But foreign currency reserves
increased by only 23 billion, leaving these economies highly exposed to any reversal in
capital flows.
7Table 2: Five Asian Economies1: Net Capital Flows
(billions of US$)
94 95 96 97e 98f
Current account balance -24.6-41.3-54.9-26.0 17.6
External financing, net 47.4 80.9 92.8 15.2 15.2
Net private flows 40.5 77.4 93.0-12.1 -9.4
   Equity investment 12.2 15.5 19.1 -4.5 7.9
     Direct equity 4.7 4.9 7.0 7.2 9.8
     Portfolio equity 7.6 10.6 12.1-11.6 1.9
   Private creditors 28.2 61.8 74.0 -7.6-17.3
     Commercial banks 24.0 49.5 55.5-21.3-14.1
     Non-bank private creditors4.2 12.4 18.4 13.7 -3.2
Net official flows 7.0 3.6 -0.2 27.2 24.6
   Int'l financial institutions -0.4 -0.6 -1.0 23.0 18.5
   Bilateral creditors 7.4 4.2 0.7 4.3 6.1
Resident lending/other, net2 -17.5-25.9-19.6-11.9 -5.7
Reserves excl.gold
(- = increase)
-5.4-13.7-18.3 22.7-27.1
1 South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines
2 Including resident net lending, monetary gold, and errors and omissions.
Source: Capital flow to Emerging market economies, Institute of International Finance, 29 January
1998.
How big the reversal in private capital flows was to prove is documented in line
3 of the table: there was a dramatic 105 billion dollar turn-around, from an inflow of
93 in 1996 to an outflow of about 12 in 1997, with commercial bank lending playing a
major role (see line 6). “As confidence eroded towards the end of 1997, maturing
short-term debt was not fully rolled over for a number of economies, especially South
Korea and Indonesia. This resulted in an estimated net outflow of $21 billion to
commercial banks in 1997 for the five economies as a group, compared with inflows of
about $56 billion in 1996,” (IIF, 1998, p.2). Portfolio investment also showed a
dramatic reversal from an inflow of 12 billion in 1996 to an outflow of the same size
the next year.
8c) The role of financial intermediation
As Radelet and Sachs (1998a, p.15) argue, “probably the biggest signs of
growing risk were in the financial sector”, and we agree with this view. As already
been mentioned, unhedged borrowing in foreign currency was on-lent in local
currency, exposing banks to currency risk. In addition, imprudent lending also played a
role in the build-up to the crisis. 
The expectation that national governments and international financial
institutions would rescue failing banks (and non-banks) seemed to have engendered
excessive risk-taking. Firms that face a decline in their net equity have an incentive to
‘gamble for resurrection’ and this moral hazard problem applies particularly in the case
of banks. (We discuss later how this can give rise to creditor panic and currency
collapse.)
Three indicators track the growing vulnerability of the financial sector in these
East Asian economies: first, there is the increase in short-term foreign borrowing;
second, the rapid rise in bank credits to private sector; and third, the high exposure to
risky and unprofitable lendings. By mid of 1997, short-term external debt relative to
liquid foreign assets (foreign exchange reserves) was as much as 2.1, 1.7, and 1.5 in
Korea, Indonesia and Thailand respectively, see Figure 2. Thanks to capital market
liberalisation, bank lending to the private sector grew rapidly, so that, by end 1996,
financial claims on the private sector  stood well above 100 percent of GDP in Korea
and Thailand (Table 3). (Indonesia offers a striking contrast; this was because large
domestic corporations borrowed directly off-shore.)
Figure 2: Short-term external debt (June 1997)
(In percent of foreign exchange reserves)
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Source: BIS.
9Table 3: Financial claims on private sector
(In percent of GDP)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Korea 103.1 110.7 121.3 128.8 133.5 140.9
Indonesia 50.7 49.5 48.9 51.9 53.7 55.8
Thailand 88.6 98.4 110.8 128.1 142.0 141.9
Source: Radelet and Sachs (1998a).
As for the third indicator, there was a growing dependence of the banking
sector on property lending: in Indonesia, for example, loans to real estate sector grew
at an annual rate of 37 percent during 1992-5, compared with 22 percent for total bank
credit (Montgomery, 1997); and in Thailand, the growth of lending by finance
companies to property sector averaged 41 percent per annum, compared with total
lending growth of 33 percent per annum during 1990-5. So there was a marked shift in
the composition of Thai finance companies’ loan portfolio; the percentage share of
property loans increased from 15 percent to about 24 percent while manufacturing
loans steadily declined from 22 percent to 15 percent during 1988-96 (see Figure 3).
In Korea, however, the growing risk was due to excessive lending in the
manufacturing sector, concentrated in large corporate conglomerates (chaebol). As can
be seen in Figure 4, companies in this sector relied heavily on debt rather than equity;
the debt to equity ratio was as high as 317 percent at the end of 1996 -- the
comparable figure for the US is around 100 percent, Corsetti et al. (1998, p.20).
Private banks kept on lending to the chaebol despite the decline in their profit margins
over several years [the profit margin (profit over sales) for the top 30 chaebol in 1996
stood at only 0.2 percent (Bhattacharya et al. (1998, p.50)]. It is worth adding that
“the vulnerability of the [Korean] banking system was increased not only by large
exposures to chaebol, but also by directed lending …, politically influenced lending,
and regulations and institutional borrowing through the financial system for on-lending
to corporations”, (IMF, 1997, p.12).
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Figure 3: Loans to real estate and manufacturing sectors
by Thai finance companies
(Share of total outstanding loans)
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Figure 4: Debt to equity ratio in Korea manufacturing sector
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Source: Bank of Korea.
d) Asset prices
Asset prices can play a key role both in signalling concern ex ante a d in
exacerbating problems when the crisis occurs. Here, we briefly describe the behaviour
of equity prices, property values and exchange rates in Korea, Indonesia and Thailand.
i. Stock markets
Although the timing and the severity of the crisis came as a surprise, some
stock markets in the region had been signalling caution for some time as can seen from
Figure 5 (using a base of 100 in January 1990). The stock market in Thailand, for
example, having risen to a plateau of about 150, began falling in early 1996 so that by
early 1997 it was standing below 100. It has fallen significantly since, to around 50. In
Korea, the KOSPI index has shown a similar pattern except that the plateau was only
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about 100 before the fall in 1996 and the collapse in 1997. (By contrast, the Indonesian
stock market gave little indication of the coming crisis: rising through 1995 and 1996
to reach a peak of about 180 in mid 1997.)
Figure 5: Stock market indices
(1/1/90 =100)
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ii. Property markets
Currency crises have often been preceded by a boom-bust cycle in asset prices,
and this was true in East Asia. Property prices (measured by prime office capital
values) surged rapidly during 1988-91 both Thailand and Indonesia (see Figure 6).
Although the downturn of real estate sector began as early as 1991-2, prices did not
drop sharply until 1997. Why not? The reason appears to be that the market was not
allowed to clear. In Thailand, for example, there is evidence of massive oversupply in
office, condominium and residential property with high rates of vacancy, but the Thai
finance companies kept rolling over their loans during 1993-96 rather than forcing
property companies into bankruptcy3.
                                                 
3 According to data from Jones Lang Wooton, the average sales price in Bangkok for office space fell
by 30.2 percent in local currency term during the second half of 1997 which is modest compared to
the fall in value of property companies in the stock market. They commented, however, that “prices
have held up artificially because of the lack of transactions. Local owners are reluctant to place
properties for sale into a falling market. There are very few local buyers and most overseas investors
have adopted a ‘wait and see’ attitude, given the falling value of the Baht. The Thai property market
is inefficient, the legal system is slow to move against insolvent owners or developers and the
Government is reluctant to move against powerful vested interest groups”, (Jones Lang Wooton,
Regional Property Market in 1998, p.32).
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Figure 6: Prime office capital values*
(1988 = 100)
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Source: Jones Lang Wooton.
Perhaps a more telling indicator is the share value of property companies in the
stock markets. As shown in Table 4, the share price of the property companies in
Thailand fell significantly by about 68 percent during four quarters before the
abandonment of Thai baht on 2 July; and by the year property companies in Thailand
were worth only 10 percent of their value 24 month before. (Although, property share
index in Indonesia showed an upward trend from September 1996 until June 1997, it
sharply declined by 58 percent during the second half of the year.)
Table 4 : Share value of property companies in stock markets
2Q96 3Q96 4Q96 1Q97 2Q97 3Q97 4Q97
Indonesia
Index 137 135 144 160 170 104 72
Percentage change -1.3 6.2 11.2 6.4 -38.9 -30.7
Thailand
Index 833 720 524 328 232 224 96
Percentage change -13.6 -27.3 -37.4 -29.2 -3.4 -57.4
Source: Datastream.
iii. Foreign exchange markets
In response to capital inflows during the 1990s, central banks intervened to
prevent exchange rate appreciation; and later, when capital flows went into reverse,
central banks used their foreign exchange reserves to resist downward pressure on the
exchange rate – as long as reserves lasted. The relative stability of nominal exchange
rates against the US dollar until the crisis erupted is shown in Table 5. The cost of the
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dollar in Thai baht, for example, was unchanged between the end of 1993 and 2Q97.
The loss of competitiveness as the dollar rose against the yen is also shown: in
Thailand, for example, the index of competitiveness (the real exchange rate) fell from
87 in 1995 to 76 just before the crisis.
Table 5: Nominal and Real exchange rates
(End-of-period price of US$)
        Korea  Indonesia  Thailand
    NominalReal1   NominalReal1   NominalReal1
1993 811 93 2112 88 25.6 88
1994 793 91 2203 92 25.1 89
1995 776 88 2289 89 25.2 87
1996 848 88 2361 80 25.7 80
1Q97 896 89 2401 75 26.0 75
2Q97 888 89 2432 78 25.9 76
3Q97 914 88 3270 99 36.3 104
4Q97 1695 157 5650 150 46.8 124
1Q98 1385 - 8650 - 39.3 -
Peak 1960 - 15450 - 56.7 -
23/12/97 23/01/98 12/01/98
1 based on WPI; trade-weighted, 1990=100
 Sources: Datastream, Radelet and Sachs (1998a) for real exchange rates.
After currency crisis began in early July, the cost of the dollar rose by more
than 30 percent in Baht and Rupiah (but only 3 percent for Korean won). All three
currencies then went into a downward spiral: so, at its peak, the dollar was worth 120
percent more in Thailand and Korea and 535 percent more in Indonesia than it was in
2Q97. Subsequently, however, both the baht and the won have recovered sufficiently
to reduce the cost of the dollar below its end 1997 level: but this is not, of course, true
for the Indonesian rupiah (see Box A).
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Box A: The special case of Indonesia
The case of Indonesia, where the collapse of the exchange rate has been so profound
and the attendant risks so great, seems to merit special consideration. Thanks to the
commanding role of the presidential family in the economy, the diversion of financial resources
and misallocation of investment was much more profound than in Korea and Thailand.
Moreover, the fall of the currency seemed to precedehe bank crisis and it surprised the hedge
funds (who are rumoured to have lost on the rupiah). The episode looks startlingly reminiscent
of a stock market crash, where falling asset values trigger the exit of stop-loss traders4.
A key role was played by the ethnic minority of resident Chinese, which constitutes
only 4 percent of the population but controls the majority of Indonesia’s largest companies.
They know that they are envied by many of those less fortunate; and they cannot forget that
half a million people were killed when ex-president Suharto gained power in 1966. So, when
the currency began to fall, there were good reasons for exit. It was not just that they might lose
their assets: their livelihoods – indeed their lives – were at risk. But capital flight by one group
can easily trigger exit by others, as seems to have happened. US investors, seeing the collapse,
decided to get out and dump the rupiah. So there was an avalanche of selling which drove the
rupiah down to alarming depths. It fell from a rate of about 2400 against the dollar before the
crisis to rate of over 15000 at its lowest point. It seems that neither the hedge funds nor the US
banks had anticipated the avalanche, as they lost substantial sums of money in the process.
How is it that these sophisticated players got caught out? Presumably it is because they failed
to factor the fears of ethnic minorities (under a corrupt and dictatorial regime) into their
calculations of market behaviour.
Another factor is that regulatory action can sometimes trigger panic rather than calm.
Radelet and Sachs (1998b, p.34) argue in particular that “the bank closures in Indonesia
provoked a financial panic and a run on the entire private-sector banking system other than the
foreign-owned banks”. (Sixteen commercial banks were suddenly closed with the explicit
proviso that deposits over 20 million Rupiah – approximately 5000 dollars at the time – would
be unprotected.) Stable doors need to be closed before, not while, the horses are bolting!
                                                 
4 This analogy also pursued in Krugman and Miller (1993) where a stop-loss model is used to explain
a crash in exchange rate, made worse by the ‘cascade effect’ (of early exit triggering an avalanche of
further exit).
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3. Varieties of currency and financial crisis
One of the most salient features of th  Asian economies being discussed was
the collapse of their exchange rates against the dollar. This encouraged many observers
to identify the crisis as a speculative attack on a fixed exchange rate, for which two
distinct kinds of explanations had already been developed. According to the first of
these, an exchange rate crisis reflects an irreconcilable conflict between the needs of
public sector finance and the preservation of a fixed exchange rate, leading to
continuous reserve depletion5. While this may have fitted earlier currency crises in
Argentina and Mexico, as indicated in the first row of Table 6, it seems quite
inappropriate for East Asian economies for two reasons: first, the economies
concerned were typically models of fiscal rectitude and second the currency crisis came
as a surprise.
More promising perhaps was the second explanation in terms of self-fulfilling
speculative attack, developed to account for the largely unanticipated collapse of
European Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992, by Maurice Obstfeld (1994, 1996) in
particular. In this case, a currency crisis involves an unanticipated shift from one
equilibrium (a peg) to another (a float)6. As pplied to the ERM crisis, the government
was faced with the choice between sticking to an exchange rate peg (with no output
stabilisation) and a surprise devaluation which would create extra jobs: in conditions of
high unemployment, it would not take much to lead people to expect the latter and it
would be optimal for the government to behave accordingly, i e., self-fulfilling. As
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1997, p.652) point out  “With multiple equilibria some seemingly
unimportant event could trigger an abrupt change in expectations, shifting the
equilibrium... Such an event would look much like [a] sudden speculative attack on
[the] exchange rate”. While self-fulfilling expectations surely played a role, it seems
inadequate to describe events as optimal regime choices by the governments
concerned.
                                                 
5 Let the financing of the public sector deficit under a fixed exchange rate – with no inflation –
involve constant depletion of foreign currency reserves: then recourse to ‘inflation taxation’ as a
means of financing the public sector deficit necessarily involves a predictable change of exchange rate
regime. This is the message of the classic paper on speculative attack by Krugman (1979).
6 What event could trigger such a change in expectations? Was it the sales of sterling by George Soros
in September/October 1992?
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Table 6 : Currency and financial crises
Models of crises Defining
characteristic
Observable features Examples
Currency crises
Predictable end of a
pegged rate
Unpredictable end of
a pegged rate
Fixed rate financially
unsustainable
Fixed rate politically
unacceptable
Continued depletion
of reserves
Self-fulfilling
expectations of
devaluation/default
by government
Mexico (1973-82)
and Argentina (1978-
81)
ERM (1992-3) and
Mexico (1994-5)
Financial crises
Bank panic due to
scramble for liquidity
Bank insolvency due
to “gambling for
resurrection”
Market ‘crashes’
i) Collapse of classic
speculative bubble
ii) Market break
caused by stop-loss
traders
Maturity mismatch
between assets and
liabilities
Asset valuations
based on truncating
the downside
Asset values
accelerating away
from equilibrium
Sudden exit due to
programme-trading
strategies
Banks solvent before
the scramble
Low equity
participation by
decision-makers
Ends in a crash
Avalanche effects
English bank panics
of 1825, 1847, 1857
and 1866
US Savings and Loan
crisis of late
1970s/early 1980s
US banking crisis
(1907) and stock
market crashes in US
(1929) and Japan
(1989/90)
US stock market
break of 1987
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The failure of these two approaches (with their focus on foreign exchange
markets and on the public sector) adequately to explain events in East Asia, has led to
a radical rethink. Could it be that a blind bank panic brought down a perfectly sound
economic system? Or could it be that East Asian miracle was flawed and the fall in the
exchange rates was a symptom of its problems? In either case, the explanation involves
financial crises in other markets.
The second half of the table, therefore, includes four further types of financial
crisis. The first of these is a liquidity crisis, represented by a bank run. While a run on
the deposits of a single, solvent bank may be satisfied by disposing of its assets to other
banks, this is not true if there is a generalised bank panic affecting the banking system
as a whole. In that case, deposit withdrawals can lead to a ‘self-fulfilling’ financial
collapse, with the efforts of all banks to dispose of illiquid assets in a hurry leading to
falling asset values and widespread insolvency. The maturity mismatch between short-
term deposits and long-term loans implies that the banking system faces two possible
equilibria – survival or collapse: and it can shift from the good to the bad by a failure of
collective action (see Radelet and Sachs, 1998b, and the summary in Box B below). It
was the succession of English bank panics from 1825 to 1866 that led Walter Bagehot
in 1873 to advocate that the central bank should stay the panic by acting as the lender
of last resort, i.e., “that in time of panic it must advance freely and vigorously to the
public out of its reserve” (Bagehot, 1915, p.187). Friedman and Schwartz (1963)
emphasise key role of US bank runs and bank closures in converting a severe downturn
into the Great Depression of 1930s (and blame the Federal Reserve for failing to avert
it).
The second type of financial crisis shown in the table involves not illiquidity but
insolvency. For firms close to bankruptcy, limited liability leads to perverse incentives
as shareholders enjoy the profit of upside returns, leaving debtholders with downside
risk. For banks or near-banks with low equity, loan managers are tempted to gamble
with depositors’ money as risky investment becomes even more attractive than safe
investment. Bondholders and other creditors will, of course, resist variance-increasing
investment strategies – unless the government insures them against losses. In which
case, the stage is set for wholesale ‘gambling for resurrection’, as in the US Savings
and Loan debacle of the 1980s.
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Box B: Multiple equilibria, co-ordination failure and forced roll-overs
Sachs and Radelet (1998b, p.5) argue that “international loan markets are prone to
self-fulfilling crises in which individual creditors may act rationally and yet market outcomes
produce sharp, costly, and fundamentally unnecessary panicked reversals in capital flows”.
Why should this be so? Assume creditors as a group would be willing to make a new loan, but
no individual creditor is willing to do so unless other creditors do the same: then, with a failure
of co-ordination among creditors, it is quite possible that there will be no lending to an illiquid
borrower. (Technically, the source of multiple equilibria is pay-off externalities, i.e., the pay-
offs to an agent adopting increases in the number of other agents adopting the same action, see
Devenow and Welch, 1996, pp.605-7.) Table B.1 provides a simple illustration of the
argument.
Table B.1: To lend or not to lend?
               Creditor 2
  Lend Not lend
Lend  50, 50             20, 30
Creditor 1
Not lend             30, 20 30, 30
The setting is one in which each of two creditors has lent 50 to a borrower who is
solvent but illiquid: solvent because the project will pay 120 in a years time; illiquid because
there are no dividends in the meantime. At the beginning of the year, however, the borrower is
required to provide a total of 20 as debt service. If each creditor is willing to relend the 10 of
debt service received, the project will continue and each will receive future repayments with a
present discounted value of 50. But if neither creditor is willing to roll over the loan, the debtor
will default and the project will be scrapped with each creditor receiving only 30 from the scrap
value. The pay-offs in these two cases are shown in the top-left and bottom-right of the table.
Note that if creditor 1 is willing to lend 10 but not creditor 2, the project will still be
scrapped and creditor 1 will be worse off (with a net return of only 30-10 = 20, see top-right
corner of the table). Likewise, if only creditor 2 is willing to roll over the loan, the pay-offs will
as shown at bottom-right. What are the equilibrium outcomes?
The cases of both creditors lending and neither lending are the two Nash equilibria of
this game – where a Nash equilibrium is defined as a situation where no creditor has the
incentive to deviate from his/her strategy given that the other does not deviate. (The arrows
show that neither creditor would logically choose to behave differently from the other.) Clearly,
continued lending is the more socially efficient equilibrium; but a failure to co-ordinate will
lead to a self-fulfilling liquidity crisis where the debtor is pushed into default, the project is
scrapped and each creditor concludes that it was right not to put extra money into a failing
project!
In circumstances where continued lending is in the self-interest of the creditors, an
enforced roll-over may be an appropriate way of handling the liquidity crisis. The co-ordinated
roll-over which saved Korea from default at the end of 1997 provides a topical example of this
policy: but the fact that half of a dozen of the chaebol have gone bankrupt suggests that the
problem was not simply one of  illiquidity.
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Financial crisis can also be provoked by the bursting of an asset bubble which
has led market valuations to depart ever further above equilibrium. Such speculative
bubble can be sustained for some time because each speculator believes that he/she will
be able to get out in time; or because excess capital gains cover the cost of insuring
against a crash, (Salant and Henderson, 1978 and Blanchard, 1979): but a return to
fundamental valuation involves a crash. The US stock price bubble which ended in
1929 is one example; the Japanese stock market crash of 1990 is another. The Nordic
banking crises of the late 1980s and early 1990s were closely associate with the boom-
and-bust of real estate crises (Drees and Pazarbasioglu (1998), in  their account of the
crises following financial liberalisation in Norway, Sweden, and Finland, conclude that
“the authorities failed to tighten prudential bank regulation and to create an adequate
supervisory framework”, p.36: so East Asia is not alone !)
Market crashes may also be triggered by stop-loss strategies adopted by traders
(see Box C). Assume, for example, that portfolio managers in equity markets are
judged by profits they make on their portfolios: then, to avoid reporting large losses,
traders may be tempted to ‘insure’ their portfolios by buying puts or programming
stop-loss orders (to sell for cash at a given price trigger). If this practice is widespread,
a fall in the market can be grossly exacerbated by programme trading; and many
believe that the 1987 stock market crash was attributable to such factors (Krugman,
1987 and Grossman, 1987).
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Box C: The stock market crash in 1987: was it due to stop-loss traders?
a) Underlying assumptions on market valuation
With real earnings (measured on horizontal axis) following a random walk with an
upward trend, g, assume that p, an index of stock market value (plotted on vertical axis)
measures the present discounted value of expected future earnings.  The schedule labelled ON
shows the stock market value if the discount factor is r, the riskless real interest rate; while the
schedule OR shows the stock market index if the discount factor includes a risk premium,r,
(reflecting the variability of earnings).
Let risk-neutral, stop-loss traders hold a percent of the shares while risk averse,
portfolio investors hold the rest. Then the schedule OW, an appropriate weighted average of
ON and OR, would give the value of stocks if a is held constant.
b) Stop-loss orders and the market crash
Assume for simplicity that all stop-loss traders have a common exit point, Px, (the
trigger price for programme trading and the optimal exercise price for market derivatives – put
options). If this is not common knowledge, then the stock market will be valued by the schedule
OW to the right of point B: but if and when earnings fall to Ec, tock market valuation will shift
to OR as the stop-loss traders exit. This implies a crash of the stock market (the fall from B to
C in the figure) as the options are exercised and the programme trades kick in. (Genotte and
Leland, 1990, develop a similar analysis of the effects of hedging.)
c) Can this happen again?
George Soros (1996) has argued that the operation of circuit breakers has reduced the
attraction of insuring portfolios by program trading, so that such a crash is a one-off event. If
the existence of stop-loss traders and their trading strategies are common knowledge, the
market should anticipate exit at Px and asset values will lie on AA’ for earnings above EA: so
when earnings fall to EA, asset valuation can switch to OR without any crash. [‘Sunshine’
trading rules, designed to make clear the position taken by all market participants, are meant to
promote common knowledge.]
1/(r+r-g)
1/(r-g)
PX
Crash
B
C
A
R
W
N
A'
Stock market index
EarningsO
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4. Elements of a new approach: illiquidity, insolvency, and moral hazard
What caused the crisis in East Asia? To help analyse these events, see Figure 7,
where the circles indicate two views. The first view, that it was a liquidity crisis, is
captured by the circle on the left. The second view, that the miracle was an
unsustainable bubble, is on the right. These views need not be mutually exclusive,
however, as the truth may involve both factors, interacting in a vicious downward
spiral. This is our view.
Figure 7: Characteristics of crises
Illiqudity Insolvency
c)
i. Collapse of
collateral value
 ii Gambling for 
resurrection
b) End of asset bubble a) A bank run
and/or
a) A bank run
Consider first the explanation given by Radelet and Sachs (1998b, p.5) in their
recent paper to the Brookings Panel where they advance their preferred explanation –
that solvent but illiquid borrowers were unable to borrow fresh funds from the capital
market in order to make current debt obligations... “The unwillingness or inability of
the capital market to provide fresh loans to the illiquid borrower is the nub of the
matter.” (This view is shown as (a) in the figure.)
By way of theoretical background, they cite the work of Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) where bank runs are triggered by exogenous stochastic demands for liquidity by
some depositors and not at all by fears of imprudent lending. Banks lend prudently and
are essentially solvent, but their investments are illiquid: it is the conflict between the
liquidity needs of some depositors and the illiquidity of the bank’s assets that can
precipitate a bank run. Of course, if the bank run is not checked, illiquidity can become
insolvency as banks seek to dump illiquid assets.
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To avert such liquidity-based bank runs, Diamond and Dybvig discuss first the
provision of deposit insurance, (as, for example, by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) operating in the US since 1934), and second the implementation
of a lender-of-last-resort facility by the central bank. Deposit insurance is meant to
prevent bank runs -- insured depositors need not withdraw their funds just because
they see other doing so7: but, as noted above, recourse to the lender of last resort is
how Bagehot recommended bank runs should be managed. In detail, he insisted “First.
That loans should only be made at a very high rate of interest”... and  “Secondly. That
at this rate these advances should be made on all good banking securities, and as
largely as the public ask for them” (Bagehot, 1915, pp.187-8); i.e., last-resort lending
should be unlimited, at a penalty rate, to solvent banks.
The provision of deposit insurance and lender-of-last-resort facilities are
normally the responsibility of national agencies. But with the globalisation of capital
markets, there are those who look to the IMF to act as the international lender of last
resort, providing reserves to countries facing liquidity crises (see Sachs, 1995).
If the crises in East Asia were just bank panics, could they not have been
avoided by appropriate provision of liquidity? And if there was nothing inherently
wrong with economic fundamentals, was mis-handled crisis management not to blame
for the negative economic fallout? Radelet and Sachs are, indeed, critical of the
policies pursued by the IMF (see ‘Why did the original IMF programs fail?’, Radelet
and Sachs, 1998b, pp.33-40); but is it really true that throwing money at the problem
was all that was needed?
                                                 
7 This is not true if the insurance is less than 100 percent or if the guarantee is not fully credible.
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b) End of an asset bubble
Consider instead the second characterisation of the crisis, namely insolvency
attributable to the collapse of asset prices as indicated in the right hand side of the
figure. Was the East Asian crisis essentially due to the bursting of an asset bubble like
the US stock market crash of 1929? This view has its attractions8, bu  it is too simple
for two reasons. First, the timing is wrong: there was a bubble in stock prices, but
stock markets in Korea and Thailand began falling in 1996 not late 1997. Second, it
underplays the role of the financial sector in the mis-valuation of assets. (Asset bubbles
may exist without necessarily involving the financial sector: one thinks of bubbles in
the prices of commodities such as gold or tulips, see Salant and Henderson, 1978, and
Garber, 1990.)
The truth, we believe,f is more complex involving perverse financial incentives,
distorted asset prices and mis-allocated resources, leading ultimately to a creditor
panic. This view is developed in the next section.
c) Illiquidity and insolvency
Credit market imperfections have been blamed for the depth and persistence of
the Great Depression in the U.S.A., Bernanke (1983): when banks failed, no other
sources of finance were available. Could similar mechanisms have played a role in
ending the East Asian miracle? In this section, we examine features of the financial
system which may account for the severity of the economic downturn. First is the
amplification of shocks that occurs when borrowing is limited to the value of collateral
in the form of land. Second is the incentive for loan managers to mis-direct investment
when bank equity is low.
i. Collapse in the value of collateral
In their model of credit cycles, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) have shown how
credit market imperfections can greatly amplify initial economic disturbances.
Specifically, they assume that small businesses, whose main asset is specific human
                                                 
8 The head-long expansion in the western stock markets over the last year looks more like an asset
bubble than a rational reappraisal of future economic prospects. The US stock market, for example,
has continued to expand since Alan Greenspan, the chairman of the Federal Reserve, warned about
“irrational exuberance”; and despite unemployment of 12 percent, the Italian stock market has more
than doubled in one year.
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capital, cannot be trusted to repay their loans: so the latter will need to be fully
collaterised. This approach has been applied to Thailand in Luangaram (1997) and
Edison et al. (1998), where the shocks considered are respectively the fall in exports
and the ending of the land price bubble.
There is strong evidence of a land price bubble in Thailand in the period before
the crisis. How could the ending of such a bubble lead to a financial collapse? Consider
the plight of highly-levered firms, whose loan limits depend on value of collateral in the
form of land. The bursting of the bubble which reduces the value of land collateral
means that loans are no longer fully collaterised. Banks reduce loan limits accordingly.
To repay loans in excess of these limits, borrowers collectively sell land. But this action
further reduces land prices, and the sequence may repeat itself until bankruptcy occurs.
This picture of hig ly-levered, credit-constrained firms illuminates the role that
credit markets can play in financial crises like that in East Asia. Excess credit creation
can easily raise asset values above equilibrium; but when this disequilibrium is being
corrected, credit constraints can set in motion a vicious downward spiral in asset
prices, leading to financial collapse.
ii. Gambling for resurrection
Bank runs in the US Great Depression have been attributed, in part, to the lack
of deposit insurance – which is why FDIC was created in 1934. Bank deposits in
Thailand and Korea, for example, were not explicitly insured by a deposit insurance
corporation but value guarantees were expected beforehand and have in fact been
given ex post. Does the existence of this implicit insurance mean that all was well? The
answer is unfortunately no. Michael Dooley (1997) highlights the risks facing
governments who insure poorly-regulated domestic financial markets: in particular, if
substantial foreign money is attracted short-term, an insurance crisis is likely to
followed by balance-of-payment crisis as foreign funds are repatriated. The problem is
that insurance gives rise to ‘moral hazard’, i.e., it has incentive effects on behaviour
towards risk. Thus bank depositors who are fully insured will have little or no incentive
to monitor bank portfolios; and bank shareholders who are protected by limited liability
may be tempted to ‘gamble for resurrection’ (see Box D).
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Box D: Moral hazard, lax bank regulation, and currency collapse9
Let domestic banks take local and foreign currency deposits and invest them in
domestic loans yielding revenues plotted on the horizontal axis of the figure below. If the banks
are risk neutral, the value of the loan portfolio (net of fixed costs) is shown by the height of the
line VV with slope 1/r, where r is the safe rate of interest. Subtracting D, the value of total
deposits being invested, gives the schedule NN which gives the equity value of the banks to the
right of B: and if revenues fall to B or below, it should close.
With limited liability and investment in relatively riskless assets, the net equity value of
the bank is approximately giving by OBN. But when the net equity of the bank is close to zero
loan managers will be tempted to raise it by switching investments so as to increase the
variance of returns, as high pay-offs will enhance shareholder profits while losses will be at
expense of depositors and bondholders. This behaviour is referred to as ‘gambling for
resurrection’ (see Campbell, 1995 and, with reference to recent crises,  Allen and Gale, 1997,
and Krugman,1998).
As an illustration, let the alternative investment available to loan managers have
positive variance and a negative mean return, -m, so the value of this investment (less D) is
given by line NR with slope 1/(r+m). Note that NR lies everywhere below NN, the value of
investing safely. When, if ever, will loan managers be tempted to switch from safe to risky
lending which pays a lower rate of interest?
To answer this, let the schedule GG give the equity value of the bank with risky
lending when losses are written off by bankruptcy (i.e., it includes the ‘put value’ implicit in
limited liability). The fact that this schedule is higher than NN to the left of S means that risky
investments with lower mean return are more attractive than safe investment when bank capital
is low. It is when revenues on the safe assets fall to X that the switch will take place: close to
B, managers have almost literally ‘nothing to lose’ by gambling. Instead closing at point B,
they will keep gambling despite the risk of mounting losses, only closing if loan revenue falls to
C, with expected losses of CL.
Figure D.1: Moral hazard in banking : “gambling for resurrection”
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Loan Revenues
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9 This is taken from Bond and Miller (1998).
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Who is to prevent loan managers from behaving in this way? Without deposit
insurance, it would have to be depositors (and bondholders) who monitor portfolio managers
and punish any sign of gambling by withdrawing deposits, for example, or by threatening
closure. With insurance, depositors have no incentive to monitor, so it is the government who
should monitor portfolio allocation decisions and punish mismanagement.
But, as explained in the text, if returns fall to the switch point (X) and this does not
trigger an appropriate regulatory response, this can be the signal for the exit of foreign
depositors and a full-blown financial crisis. The danger of allowing or encouraging substantial
short-term capital inflows to pour into a weakly regulated banking system is only too apparent:
failure to regulate at the switch point can trigger a bank run and currency collapse if foreign
deposits (DF) are large relative to foreign currency reserves.
The history of the US Savings and Loan industry in the 1980s bears vivid
witness. When President Reagan deregulated the industry, deposit insurance was left in
place but loan managers were freed of restrictions on portfolio investment. As a
consequence, loan managers who were unwilling to gamble were soon replaced by
those who were! And it was not long before practically the whole industry became
insolvent, Krugman (1990).
The moral of this tale is that limited liability and insurance provisions designed
to avoid financial panic may create severe problems of moral hazard (i.e., in trying to
avoid bank runs due to illiquidity, one may end up with insolvency due to gambling for
resurrection). To avoid this potentially disastrous outcome, some have suggested
restoring the incentives to monitor by removing deposit insurance. As Dewatripont and
Tirole (1994) point out, this is a counsel of perfection; most bank deposits are small
and depositors are uninformed so they won’t or can’t monitor. Instead, it is the
providers of deposit insurance who must first of all monitor closely the institutions
involved and second act swiftly to prevent imprudent lending (by insisting on early
closure10, for example). Both features were incorporated in the US Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) passed in 1991, Mazumdar (1997).
What about the banking system in East Asia? Alas! the regulatory regime governing
banks there was more akin to that of the Savings and Loan industry under President
Reagan than to current US banking under FDICIA.
What if the state provides the guarantee but fails to check the moral hazard, as
seems to have been true in several East Asian countries? Then (at the very least) local
                                                 
10 The moral hazard problems arising in the banking industry are analysed by Dewatripont and Tirole
(1994), assuming that financial panic can be avoided by a deposit insurance. In their monograph on
the prudential regulation of banks, they treat the problem as one of corporate governance and discuss
how effective the BIS capital adequacy ratio may be as triggers for regulatory action.
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tax payers must expect substantial tax charges to cover the losses of the insurance
agency. Provided the agency will be bailed out, local currency depositors may rest
assured. But the same may not be true for foreign currency depositors11. They see local
banks mis-managing their portfolios without any regulatory response and they can
forecast bank insolvencies. They also know that, while the local central bank can print
domestic currency, it can’t print dollars! So, if foreign currency reserves are low
relative to foreign currency deposits, the stage is set for a bank run as foreign currency
depositors head for safety. And the central bank, having lost all its reserves will be
forced to float the currency.
Moreover, the willingness of the IMF to act as a lender of last resort in foreign
currency terms is clearly hampered where there is unchecked moral hazard in local
banking system. Lending into this situation will not avoid the problem: it may even
lead to greater losses for local tax payers (as the S & L experience suggests).
                                                 
11 “The effective functioning of deposit insurance depends on the deposits being in domestic currency;
countries with dollarized banking systems often leave themselves exposed to creditor runs even when
some deposit insurance arrangements are in place, because such deposit insurance often lacks
adequate reserve funds and therefore credibility”, (Radelet and Sachs, 1998b, p.9)
28
Table 7: Selected severe banking crises, 1980-96
Country (time period of
crisis)
Estimate of total
losses/costs
(percentage of GDP)
Latin America
Argentina (1980-82) 55
Chile (1981-83) 41
Venezuela (1994-95) 18
Mexico (1995) 12-15a
Industrial countries
Spain (1977-85) 17
Japan (1990s) 10b
a. accumulated loses to date.
b. estimate of potential losses.
Source: Goldstein (1997)
How significant are the losses arising from perverse incentives in financial
intermediaries? The US Savings and Loan crisis showed that they can spiral rapidly in
the absence of prompt corrective action; and the ultimate resolution cost of the
S & L debacle was estimated at between two and three percent of GDP. The bill for
clearing up after severe banking crisis (recapitalising and restructuring) is much
greater. As can be seen from Table 7, resolution costs have run from ten percent to
half of one year’s GDP. (See also Lindgren et al. (1996).)
One key difference between the long-running debt crisis in Latin America in the
1980s and the spectacular crises in Asia in 1997, both of which involved lending by US
and other western banks, is that the former produced the 1982 Volcker initiative and a
general standstill on banking movements, whereas 1997 produced currency collapses in
Asia. The main reason for this difference is the scale of western banks’ involvement in
1982 (petro-dollar recycling, etc.) threatened their own solvency if they tried to
withdraw funds, whereas in 1997 there was no such threat – at least until very late
1997 when Korea was faced with default and banks were persuaded to roll-over some
of the short-term loans. Suggestions for forcing creditors to the negotiating table are
discussed in the conclusions below.
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6. Was it contagion?
The Thai baht was forced off its peg in the summer of 1997 and it had lost a
quarter of its value by October. This devaluation led to speculative pressure against
neighbouring countries with exchange rate pegs against the dollar, especially Malaysia,
Indonesia, and the Philippines. Even Hong Kong and Singapore came under pressure
despite their strong current account and fiscal positions. This is commonly referred to
as the effect of ‘contagion’. What does that mean?
Table 8: Contemporaneous crisis: 4 causes
Cause Mechanism Examples Is it contagion?
Common shock - High US interest rates
- Yen devaluation
- Debt crises in 1980s
- East Asia 1996/7
No
Spillover
externalities
International
competitiveness
ERM crises 1992/3
East Asia 1997/8
Maybe
Psychological
externalities
Changing expectationsSterling devaluation
1992 (following hard on
heels of Lira)
Yes
Informational
externalities,
herding
Imperfect information Latin America 1982 ff
East Asia 1997
Yes
To answer this question, Masson (1997) distinguishes various causes of
contemporaneous crisis and these are shown in the first three rows of Table 8. First is
where there exists a ‘monsoonal effect’ i.e., “a common cause, for instance, policies
undertaken by industrial countries which have similar effects on emerging markets”,
p.2. The debt crisis in the early 1980s is cited as an example where the common cause
was a sharp increase in US interest rates. There is also surely abundant evidence of
monsoonal effects in East Asia – the rise of US dollar against the yen, for example, and
the challenge posed by the entry of China into world markets with some similar
product lines and with a devalued currency. But we agree with Masson that this should
not be referred to as contagion.
Second is where a crisis in one emerging market affects fundamentals in others,
termed a ‘spillover’. The example of the ERM crises illustrates: “the devaluation of
several EMS currencies in 1992-93 made the parities of the remaining ones more
fragile, since those countries’ real effective exchange rates had appreciated”, p.3. Note
that such spillover effects are referred to as contagion by Gerlach and Smets (1994).
30
In the third line of the table is what Masson himself defines as contagion,
namely when a crisis in one country triggers the crisis elsewhere “for reasons
unexplained by economic fundamentals, perhaps for psychological reasons or because
lack of liquidity in one market leads financial intermediary to liquidate other emerging
market assets”, p.2. Thus he reserves the label for cases which essentially involve shifts
of expectation in models of multiple equilibria (“contagion would only occur in a
situation in which multiple equilibria were possible, and a crisis in one country would
elsewhere trigger a shift from one of the equilibria to another”,  p.6). Obstfeld (1994)
had pointed out that the market for international sovereign debt can have multiple
equilibria12; and in his ingenious paper, Masson extends the idea to explain the
elements of contagion so clearly present in East Asia. He constructs a simple model for
the purpose to see which countries were liable to suffer from this phenomenon.
In line four, we list separately the idea that contagion may be due to
informational externalities rather than to purely psychological factors. Where hard
information is difficult to come by, it may be tempting for agents to use the behaviour
of others as a proxy. The result is herd behaviour, as analysed by Banerjee (1992), who
uses it to explain why diners shun empty restaurants in favour of those that are already
quite full. In their survey, Devenow and Welch (1996) conclude that such information
externalities are the most general explanation of herding. (For the informational
cascades and market crashes that may arise from pattern of learning see also In Ho Lee
(1997).) Herding may well have occurred in East Asia where many investors had only
limited information, partly because of a lack of effort on their side and partly also
because of the lack of transparency in the markets themselves. In these circumstances,
a bank run due to shaky fundamentals in one country could well be imitated elsewhere,
as investors join the herd heading for the exit. This shift from good to bad equilibria
induced by examples elsewhere is not unlike the multiple equilibria phenomenon
described by Masson: but the mechanism at work here is an informational externality,
possibly exacerbated by the monitoring rules governing investor behaviour (see
Devenow and Welch (1996), pp.607-9): portfolio managers may be punished for
continued exposure in regions with failing prospects.
                                                 
12 The reason is essentially that devaluation is a form of debt default: and expectations of the
devaluation, by raising interest rates, actually make default more attractive. So, there often exist two
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7. Crisis prevention and management
What can be done to avert further financial crises or at least to mitigate their
consequences? One step upon which most commentators are agreed is to improve the
regulation of financial institutions in emerging countries, so as to insure greater
transparency and proper monitoring of bank portfolios13, and taking prompt corrective
action when danger threatens. Beyond that, commentators differ widely. We outline
three contrasting views.
a) “Go with the flow”: the US Treasury view
We begin with the ‘liberal’, or free market view of the US government as
recently put by Larry Summers14 , deputy secretary of the US treasury. “The case for
capital account liberalisation”, he argued, “is a case for allowing capital to seek the
highest productivity investments”, though he warned that “inflows in search of genuine
economic opportunities are one thing. Inflows in search of government guarantees
...are quite another”. In view of the acknowledged danger of liberalising capital flows
when incentives are distorted, he concluded that “the pace of opening up should be
matched by the pace of developing a sound domestic financial system”.
What changes (if any) are needed at an international level? Summers
acknowledges that “there will never be enough money in the world to respond as an
official lender of last resort to all the crises that can appear... as capital flows increase”;
but he dismisses proposals for “speed bumps or other forms of capital controls” as
more likely to do harm than good. Three suggestions are made from improving the
global financial system. The first two are familiar and uncontroversial - greater
transparency and improved prudential standards; third is the proposal to “ensure that
policymakers do not confront the choice between uncontrolled chaos and confusion,
on the one hand, and large bailouts, on the other”. Unfortunately, it is not made clear
                                                                                                                                
possible equilibria - low interest rates with low default versus high interest rates with high default;
and the switch from the former to the latter can be described as a crisis for the country in question.
13 Canada and Britain have proposed a new surveillance structure for this purpose: this would
combine the World Bank financial operations unit with staff from the IMF and be responsible both for
general surveillance and for devising financial sector reform for countries in crises, (FT, April 15,
1998).
14 “Go with the flow”, FT, March 11, 1998.
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how these can be achieved (though the reference to bankruptcy law implies some sort
of workout procedure, see below).
b) International monetary reform : A “first best” approach
The appropriate counterpart to globalised capital markets would in principle be
the globalisation of controls developed at the national level – mechanisms like deposit
insurance and the lender of last resort. The former could well be delegated to national
central banks; but not the latter. This poses the key question: can the IMF as currently
constituted act as an effective international lender of last resort?
Even those in favour of substantial reform answer no. In Sachs’s view, for
example, IMF procedures are – and are bound to remain – too slow to stop bank runs
in any case; and he is against enhancing their resources and discretion because,
according to him, the IMF is already too powerful and too unaccountable15. Krugman
too is sceptical: instead of “a sort of super-IMF with the huge resources needed to act
as a full-fledged lender of last resort and with extensive direct regulatory powers over
the banks of member countries,” he reckons that “we will be lucky if the existing, far-
from-super IMF gets the modest funding increase it is seeking”16.
What about second best?
c) International monetary reform : “Second best” approaches
Noting that financial liberalisation preceded the dangerous build-up of short-
term foreign currency exposure in East Asia, Radelet and Sachs (1998b, p.40)
conclude that ... “the rapid push towards fully open capital markets among the
developing countries would seem to be misguided. There is certainly no strong
empirical evidence that economic growth in middle-income developing countries
depends on unfettered access to short-term capital flows from abroad... The policy
goal ... should be to support long-term capital flows, especially foreign direct
investment, and equity portfolio flows, but to limit short-term international flows
mainly to the financing of short-term trade transactions”.
Two mechanisms for doing so are discussed, first inflow controls (as in Chile)
and second explicit supervisory limits. Though they concede the former are more
                                                 
15 “IMF is a Power Unto Itself”, FT, December 12, 1997.
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attractive on economic grounds, they argue for the latter in term of practical
enforcement (administration and monitoring).
Since South Korean debt default was avoided by an involuntary roll-over on
the part of western banks just before Christmas, Radelet and Sachs (1998b) make the
case for generalised orderly work-out arrangements. (“The Korean negotiations
demonstrated that such a mechanism could work in  practice. Now, we suppose, we
will have to discover whether it can work in theory and thereby pursued more
systematically in future!”, p.43.) In other words, besides prudential limits on capital
controls, they are hinting at another institutional innovation – equivalent of an
International Bankruptcy Court. (See the discussion of a payment standstill for
sovereign debt in Miller and Zhang, 1997.) Ironically enough, the most plausible venue
would probably be the IMF itself!
8. Looking Ahead
How and when will these economies recovery from the crisis? The example of
Mexico is encouraging as its growth rate dropped sharply but recovered quickly.
Japan, however, provides a sombre warning, growth has not recovered from slowdown
caused by the bursting asset bubbles of 1989. To the extent that the spectacular growth
rates in Asia were a catch-up phenomenon, they cannot be extrapolated indefinitely,
Young (1994, 1995) and Krugman (1994). So maybe it is too optimistic to expect a
simple return of ‘business as usual’. The enormous devaluation has made Asian goods
more competitive in the world market. But there are three conditions for a resumption
of healthy growth, which have yet to be fulfilled: first, the recapitalisation and
restructuring of the financial systems in East Asia; second, the recovery of aggregate
demand in Asia itself; and third, preventing any recurrence of the crisis.
In respect of the first two conditions, Japan plays a crucial role. But the
economy there has been chronically weak for five years, with growing financial fragility
and indecisive fiscal policy, and Japan is now in recession. People are increasing
looking into China to take over as Asia’s main engine of growth – even if the renminbi
has to be devalued again. The third condition will require changes in the rules and
practices of international finance, considered next.
                                                                                                                                
16 “Start taking the Prozac”, FT, April 9, 1998.
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9 Conclusion
There was evidence of flawed fundamentals in East Asia – overvaluation,
overinvestment, and under-regulation, to name but three: but the countries concerned
have learned bitter lessons and have every incentive to avoid any repetition. With
rapidly liberalisation leading to feast followed by famine, it is evident that global capital
markets have also misallocated resources. Actions now must be taken to resolve the
burden of outstanding debts; and to change the international rules of the game to help
prevent any recurrence. In particular, we propose the following:
a) Steps needed to resolve the current crisis
- For the Asian central banks to establish the magnitude of the potential losses
resulting from implicit deposit insurance and to consider measures appropriate for
financial resolution in such cases. It may be that the full payment of guarantees to
foreign creditors should be made conditional on restructuring debt, i.e, long-term roll-
overs.
- For creditors and debtors (in Indo esia, for example) to get together to
negotiate the write-down of debts that are beyond the capacity to pay. It has been
suggested that to bring creditors to the negotiating table, debtors might consider a
unilateral stay of payments and international financial institutions should continue to
lend to them, subject to appropriate conditionality17.
b) Steps to reform international monetary system
i) establishing a surveillance mechanism of financial regulations and
supervisory systems, jointly staffed by the IMF and the World Bank (which can also
devise financial sector reforms for countries in crisis);
ii) devising a set of administratively practical, capital inflow controls and
regulatory procedures along the lines of FDICIA (1991), to reduce financial
vulnerability of the emerging market economies;
iii) not writing the requirement of capital account liberalisation into the Articles
of the IMF until it is safe to do so; and
                                                 
17 The strategic case for a payments standstill is discussed in Miller and Zhang (1997); it appears that
the Bank for International Settlements is advocating such a policy in this case (BIS, 1998, chapter 9).
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iv) instead, convening a Working Party of the G10 on ‘Resolving Liquidity
Crises by Roll-overs and Workouts’ t  recommend changes in the Articles of the IMF
needed to protect debtor countries trapped in liquidity crises18.
Without prompt action to resolve the current financial crisis, East Asia could be
condemned to prolonged recession: without reform of the international monetary
system, these crises will recur.
                                                 
18 This would be a follow-up of the Rey Report (1996) on the resolution of sovereign liquidity crises:
but, given the gravity of the crises, it will hopefully have a much greater impact.
36
APPENDIX 1 : Five Asian economies: Basic economic data
(In percent of GDP unless otherwise noted)
INDONESIA
75-82 83-89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 971
Real sector
Real GDP growth2 6.2 5.5 9.0 8.9 7.2 7.3 7.5 8.2 8.0 5.0
Inflation2,3 15.0 8.1 7.8 9.4 7.5 9.7 8.5 9.4 7.9 8.3
Domestic saving 19.3 23.2 27.9 28.7 27.3 31.4 29.2 29.0 28.8 27.3
Fixed capital formation 19.8 24.3 28.3 27.0 25.8 26.3 27.6 28.4 28.1 26.5
Public sector
General government balance - -1.3 1.3 - -1.2 -0.7 - 0.8 1.4 2.0
Public sector balance - - - - - - - - - -
Monetary sector
M2 growth (end of year)2 29.3 27.0 44.6 17.5 19.8 20.2 20.0 27.2 27.2 -
Domestic credit growth (end of year)2 42.1 48.3 58.3 18.9 14.1 21.0 22.9 21.7 22.7 -
Foreign liabilities of banks4 2.2 4.2 11.0 8.6 10.3 20.9 10.9 9.6 8.5 -
External sector
Current account balance -1.2 -3.5 -2.8 -3.4 -2.2 -1.5 -1.7 -3.3 -3.3 -2.9
External debt service 3.5 6.8 8.3 8.4 8.7 8.4 8.6 8.5 9.0 10.5
KOREA
75-82 83-89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 971
Real sector
Real GDP growth2 7.0 9.6 9.5 9.1 5.1 5.8 8.6 8.9 7.1 6.0
Inflation2,3 17.6 3.8 8.6 9.3 6.2 4.8 6.3 4.5 4.9 4.3
Domestic saving 25.7 32.7 36.1 35.9 35.1 35.2 34.6 35.1 33.3 32.9
Fixed capital formation 29.4 29.4 37.1 38.4 36.6 36.0 35.7 36.6 36.8 36.6
Public sector
General government balance -2.7 -0.3 -0.6 -1.6 -2.6 -1.0 -1.0 - - -
Public sector balance - - - - - - - - - -
Monetary sector
M2 growth (end of year)2 30.0 16.8 17.2 21.9 14.9 16.6 18.7 15.6 15.8 -
Domestic credit growth (end of year)2 11.6 22.8 24.8 22.4 11.7 12.7 18.4 14.7 19.4 -
Foreign liabilities of banks4 9.4 7.3 6.5 7.7 7.6 6.9 8.0 10.1 12.8 -
External sector
Current account balance -4.6 2.5 -0.9 -3.0 -1.5 0.1 -1.2 -2.0 -4.9 -2.9
External debt service - - - - - - - - - -
MALAYSIA
75-82 83-89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 971
Real sector
Real GDP growth2 7.1 5.4 9.6 8.6 7.8 8.3 9.2 9.5 8.6 7.0
Inflation2,3 5.3 2.0 2.8 2.6 4.7 3.5 3.7 3.4 3.5 3.7
Domestic saving 21.6 29.4 29.1 28.4 31.3 33.0 32.7 33.5 36.7 37.0
Fixed capital formation 29.4 28.5 32.4 36.4 36.0 38.3 40.1 43.0 42.2 42.7
Public sector
General government balance - -4.0 -2.2 0.1 -3.5 -2.6 2.5 3.8 4.2 1.6
Public sector balance - - - - -3.5 -2.6 2.5 3.2 1.6 1.8
Monetary sector
M2 growth (end of year)2 20.2 9.2 10.6 16.9 29.2 26.6 12.7 20.0 - -
Domestic credit growth (end of year)2 5.3 19.9 18.0 18.5 16.6 12.3 14.8 29.5 - -
Foreign liabilities of banks4 6.3 6.7 7.3 9.0 13.0 19.5 8.8 6.5 - -
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External sector
Current account balance -2.0 -0.7 -2.1 -8.8 -3.8 -4.8 -7.8 -10.0 -4.9 -5.8
External debt service5 3.8 9.0 6.9 5.9 5.6 6.1 5.2 6.6 5.4 8.4
THAILAND
75-82 83-89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 971
Real sector
Real GDP growth2 7.0 8.1 11.6 8.1 8.2 8.5 8.9 8.7 6.4 0.6
Inflation2,3 9.0 3.1 6.0 5.7 4.1 3.4 5.1 5.8 5.9 6.0
Domestic saving 19.6 25.4 32.6 35.2 34.3 34.9 34.9 34.3 33.1 31.8
Fixed capital formation 23.6 27.7 40.2 41.6 39.2 39.4 39.9 41.8 40.8 35.8
Public sector
General government balance -5.8 -3.0 4.4 4.2 2.6 2.1 2.0 2.6 1.6 -0.4
Public sector balance - - - 4.0 1.6 0.9 1.8 2.5 2.2 1.9
Monetary sector
M2 growth (end of year)2 19.3 18.8 26.7 19.8 15.6 18.4 12.9 17.0 12.6 -
Domestic credit growth (end of year)2 15.6 19.8 26.8 15.5 18.0 22.7 28.9 23.1 14.0 -
Foreign liabilities of banks4 5.8 6.3 6.4 6.0 6.9 11.7 20.3 24.3 23.3 -
External sector
Current account balance -5.6 -3.2 -8.3 -7.7 -5.6 -5.0 -5.6 -8.0 -7.9 -3.9
External debt service 3.8 5.8 3.8 4.0 4.3 4.4 4.8 5.0 5.4 7.1
PHILIPPINES
75-82 83-89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 971
Real sector
Real GDP growth2 5.6 1.1 3.0 -0.6 0.3 2.1 4.4 4.8 5.7 4.3
Inflation2,3 11.0 15.4 12.7 18.7 8.9 7.6 9.0 8.1 8.4 5.2
Domestic saving 19.9 18.1 18.7 18.0 19.5 18.4 19.4 17.8 19.7 21.0
Fixed capital formation 26.7 20.7 24.0 20.0 20.9 23.8 23.6 22.2 23.2 25.1
Public sector
General government balance -2.0 -2.8 -3.5 -2.1 -1.2 -1.6 -1.6 -1.4 -0.4 -0.9
Public sector balance - - - - - -2.0 -0.6 -0.1 0.1 0.3
Monetary sector
M2 growth (end of year)2 20.5 21.4 22.5 17.3 13.9 27.1 24.4 24.2 23.2 -
Domestic credit growth (end of year)2 6.2 21.5 30.7 -2.6 17.6 131.2 19.0 31.3 40.3 -
Foreign liabilities of banks4 16.0 12.9 14.9 11.5 12.9 10.9 12.9 13.9 21.9 -
External sector
Current account balance -6.5 -0.3 -6.1 -2.3 -1.6 -5.5 -4.6 -4.4 -4.7 -4.5
External debt service 5.5 8.5 8.1 9.0 7.2 7.8 7.2 6.5 7.3 6.0
Source: World Economic Outlook, IMF, December 1997.
1 IMF estimate.
2 Annual percent change.
3 Consumer price index
4 In percent of total liabilities of the banking system.
5 Excludes prepayments and refinancing and includes staff estimates of short-term interest payments.
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